The relationship between cognitive ability and personality scores in selection situations: A meta‐analysis by Schilling, Michael et al.
Int J Select Assess. 2021;29:1–18. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ijsa  |  1
1  | INTRODUC TION
Faking—the intentional distortion of answers by applicants—is a 
frequently occurring phenomenon found when personality tests 
are used for personnel selection (e.g., Anglim et al., 2018; Birkeland 
et al., 2006; Galić et al., 2012; Griffin & Wilson, 2012). In this con-
text, interindividual differences in faking behavior are particu-
larly problematic, as they can affect the applicants’ rank order 
and thus the validity of selection decisions (König et al., 2011; 
McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006; Raymark & 
Tafero,  2009).  The majority  of  faking  theories  attribute  these  dif-
ferences in applicants’ faking to two factors in particular (Ellingson 
& McFarland, 2011; Marcus, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Snell 
et  al.,  1999):  (a)  applicants’ motivation  to  present  themselves  in  a 
highly favorable way in order to improve their chances within the 
selection process, and (b) the abilities needed to manage the image 
they convey to the organization by distorting the answers in the re-
quired direction.
Regarding  the abilities aspect,  some authors  (e.g.,  Johnson & 
Hogan, 2006; Kleinmann et al., 2011) even suggested that part of 
the criterion validity of personality tests may be attributed to the 
fact that such abilities necessary for faking are also of great rele-
vance in today's working world. In line with this argument, several 
theoretical models have identified applicants’ cognitive ability as a 
crucial determinant of the occurrence and magnitude of faking be-
havior (e.g., Marcus, 2009; Snell et al., 1999; Tett & Simonet, 2011). 
However,  previous  empirical  results  were  inconclusive,  while 
a substantial proportion of studies found a corresponding ef-
fect  (Grubb  &  McDaniel,  2007;  Levashina  et  al.,  2014;  Pauls  & 
Crost,  2005),  others  did  not  (Furnham  et  al.,  2008;  Levashina 
et al., 2009; Mudgett, 2000; Schilling et al., 2020). Not only are 
results inconclusive, it is also unclear why there are such inclusive 
results. For example, faking of personality tests has been studied 
in the field and in the lab, and both research strategies have their 
advantages and disadvantages that could also matter for the re-
lationship of cognitive ability (e.g., van Hooft & Born, 2012; Ryan 
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minant of faking—the intentional distortion of answers by candidates—but the cor-
responding empirical findings in the area of personality tests are often ambiguous. 
Following the assumption that CA is important for faking, we expected applicants 
with high CA to show higher personality scores in selection situations, leading in 
this case to significant correlations between CA and personality scores, but not in 
nonselection situations. This meta-analysis (66 studies, k = 115 individual samples, 
N =  46,265)  showed  this  pattern of  results  as well  as moderation  effects  for  the 
study design (laboratory vs. field), the response format of the personality test, and 
the type of CA test.
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et al., 1998). Similarly,  some researchers have used Likert  scaled 
personality tests, whereas others have used forced-choice tests 
(e.g.,  Hausknecht,  2010;  MacKenzie  et  al.,  2010),  and  cognitive 
abilities have been measured with different kinds of operational-
izations (e.g., verbal vs. nonverbal cognitive ability tests, e.g., Hale 
& Padgett, 2014; Klehe et  al.,  2012). Thus,  it  remains open how 
much which cognitive ability is related to faking and what vari-
ables moderates this relationship. An answer to these questions 
will help to provide a better understanding of the phenomenon of 
faking and thus of the consequences of faking for the construct 
and criterion validity of personality tests.
The goal of the current study was, therefore, to provide aggre-
gated results concerning the relationship of participants’ cognitive 
ability and their faking in personality tests during selection situa-
tions. Given that only a minority of studies directly report a corre-
sponding effect size, our meta-analysis focused on the correlation 
between cognitive ability and personality scores. We compared this 
meta-analytic correlation between selection samples and nonselec-
tion samples because it can be found in different kinds of studies, 
irrespective of whether they were conducted in the laboratory or 
in the field or how they operationalized faking. In the following, we 
explain how the relationship between cognitive ability and faking 
should affect corresponding correlations, and we introduce possible 
moderating variables in this context.
1.1 | Personality tests in selection and 
cognitive ability
The majority of faking theories have agreed that successful faking 
requires not only the motivation to present oneself in a highly fa-
vorable way, but also the ability to behave and answer appropriately 
(Levashina et al., 2009; Marcus, 2009; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006; 
Roulin et al., 2016; Snell et al., 1999). Applicants, for instance, have to 
identify the expectations of hiring organizations (i.e., the criteria on 
which they are being assessed) to subsequently show self-benefitting 
behavior (Kleinmann et al., 2011; König et al., 2006). For personality 
tests, this means that applicants could try to figure out which pole of 
a personality test item the hiring organizations consider the positive 
one so that they can move their response toward this pole (Klehe 
et al., 2012). Applicants with higher cognitive ability should handle 
this mainly analytical task more easily, which may, in turn, lead to 
more faking behavior among these applicants (Tett & Simonet, 2011).
However, when empirically analyzing the relationship between 
applicants’ cognitive ability and their faking in personality tests 
in the form of a meta-analysis, the diversity of previous studies 
posed a particular challenge. Thus, large differences in the study 
design and in the operationalization of faking posed hurdles that 
prevent a direct aggregation of the previous study results. Part of 
the research in this area consisted of field studies which examined 
faking only at a group level, thus not allowing for the calculation of 
individual-level correlations between cognitive ability and faking 
(e.g., MacKenzie et al., 2010). The other part of the studies were 
laboratory studies, which predominantly used a within-person de-
sign, where the participants took the personality test twice, once 
honest, and once with the instruction to respond as an applicant. 
However,  even within  this  group of  laboratory  studies,  aggrega-
tion of results turned out quite hard as the operationalizations of 
faking differed substantially (for a detailed overview of different 
operationalizations  of  faking,  see  Burns  &  Christiansen,  2011). 
Thus, some studies operationalized faking as the difference be-
tween the participant personality scores in both conditions (e.g., 
Peterson et al., 2009), others measure faking as the within-person 
correlation on  item  level  (e.g., Mersman & Shultz, 1998) or mod-
eled faking as a latent factor in a structural equation model, which 
loads on all personality dimensions under selection condition but 
not under honest condition (e.g., Wrensen & Biderman, 2005). As 
a result, only a small fraction of the laboratory studies report the 
direct relationship between cognitive ability and faking required 
for meta-analytic calculations (for instance, less than 20 percent 
of the laboratory studies included in this meta-analysis reported 
a corresponding effect-size).  In addition,  there were also a num-
ber of laboratory studies that did not use within-person design 
and instead measured faking with social desirability or impression 
management scales (e.g., Robie et al., 2010).
In  order  to  aggregate  the  results  of  as  many  of  these  studies 
as possible, our analysis is based on what, we believe, is the most 
basic indicator of the corresponding relationship: the correlation 
between applicants’ cognitive ability and their personality scores in 
selection situations. If cognitive ability is a determinate of faking, it 
should also be a predictor of personality scores in selection situa-
tions. Thereby, the necessary correlations were provided in almost all 
studies, whether they were field or laboratory studies, whether it was 
a within or between-person design, whether faking was operational-
ized as difference between personality scores under two conditions, 
as a score on an impression management scale or was modeled as a 
latent variable in a structural equation model. Finally, we will com-
pare our results with those from samples in which the personality 
test was not completed under the pressure of a selection situation 
(abbreviated asnonselection samples) so that we can conclude the re-
lationship between cognitive ability and faking. Previous meta-anal-
yses without a focus on selection situations showed no, or rather 
low, correlations between cognitive ability and personality scores 
(Lange, 2013; Poropat, 2009).1 Assuming that applicants with higher 
cognitive ability are more successful at faking (e.g., Marcus, 2009; 
McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Snell et al., 1999) and that successful faking 
usually leads to higher scores on personality tests, we expect to find 
higher correlations between cognitive ability and personality scores 
in selection samples than in nonselection samples.
Hypothesis 1 Correlations between cognitive ability and personal-
ity scores are higher in selection samples than in nonselection 
samples.
Based on the diversity of faking research, there is much to sug-
gest that the relationship between cognitive ability and personality 
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also  varies  systematically.  In  the  following  sections, we  introduce 
three meta-analytic moderators, which address the diversity of 
study designs, differences in the personality tests used, and differ-
ences in the type of cognitive ability tests employed.
2  | MODER ATOR HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Study design (laboratory vs. field)
In  general,  most  studies  in  the  area  of  faking  research  can  be 
assigned  to  two  categories  (Birkeland  et  al.,  2006):  (a)  studies 
conducted in the field, with real applicants in actual selection 
situations  and  (b)  studies  conducted  in  the  laboratory with  par-
ticipants who are put in a simulated selection situation or who 
are  instructed  to  fake.  Previous  meta-analyses  about  faking  in 
field and laboratory studies found significantly higher faking ef-
fects in the laboratory than in field studies (Birkeland et al., 2006; 
Hooper, 2007). Regarding this difference, some authors have ar-
gued that the processes underlying faking likely differ between 
the two types of studies  (Ones et al., 1996):  In  field studies,  the 
applicants’ motivation to fake depends on many individual factors, 
including subjective considerations and situational circumstances. 
In laboratory studies, the faking motivation arises rather from the 
concrete instruction or from the cover story that is used to in-
duce the application situation; this should lead to a similarly high 
faking motivation for all participants, which, in turn, may lead to 
individual differences in the ability to convert this motivation into 
faking behavior becoming more evident. In this line, we, therefore, 
expect higher correlations between cognitive ability and personal-
ity scores in laboratory studies than in field studies.
Hypothesis 2 Correlations between cognitive ability and personality 
scores are higher in laboratory studies than in field settings.
2.2 | Type of personality test
There are two main types of personality tests used in personnel 
selection (Vasilopoulos et al., 2006): (a) forced-choice personality 
tests, in which participants have to choose between statements 
representing different personality dimensions for each single 
item, and (b) single-stimulus personality tests, in which each item 
belongs to one personality dimension, for which the participants 
have to express their rejection or approval or something in be-
tween. Forced-choice tests can be considered as fairly robust 
against faking (Cao & Drasgow, 2019; Martin et al., 2002), mainly 
because it should be more difficult to answer in a socially desir-
able manner if one item includes two equally desirable dimensions 
(Vasilopoulos et al., 2006).  In this case, applicants who are moti-
vated to fake are faced with the task of determining which of the 
corresponding dimensions is most relevant for a future employer. 
This analytical task is difficult because in contrast to the single-
stimulus personality tests, the social desirability of the items pro-
vides the applicants with fewer hints for successful faking. Given 
this increased difficulty with regard to faking in forced-choice 
personality tests, cognitive ability should be even more important 
when this type of test is used. Therefore, we expect higher corre-
lations between cognitive ability and personality scores in samples 
completing forced-choice tests than in samples completing single-
stimulus tests.
Hypothesis 3 Correlations between cognitive ability and personality 
scores are higher in studies employing forced-choice personality 
tests than in studies employing single-stimulus personality tests.
2.3 | Type of cognitive ability test
The type of cognitive ability test is also a potential moderator of 
the correlation between cognitive ability and personality scores. 
Previous studies showed higher correlations between verbal cogni-
tive ability and faking than between nonverbal cognitive ability and 
faking (Grieve & Mahar, 2010; MacCann, 2013). The authors of these 
studies argued that a deeper understanding of the items is beneficial 
for effective faking, which underlines the importance of verbal cog-
nitive ability. Following MacCann (2013) as well as Grieve and Mahar 
(2010),  we  thus  expect  higher  correlations  in  samples  completing 
verbal cognitive ability tests than in samples completing nonverbal 
cognitive ability tests.











































TA B L E  1   English search terms
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Hypothesis 4 Correlations between cognitive ability and personality 
scores are higher if cognitive ability is measured with verbal than 
with nonverbal cognitive ability tests.
Studies that cannot be classified into one of the aforementioned 
categories will be summarized in a mixed category. We have no fur-
ther hypotheses regarding this mixed category.
3  | METHODS
3.1 | Literature search
Four strategies were used to identify studies for this meta-analysis: 
(a) We conducted an extensive  literature search using the databases 
Scopus,  Science  Direct,  PsycINFO,  PsycArticles,  ERIC,  EconLit, 




out in English and German. The literature search was conducted over 






our inclusion and exclusion criteria (which we will describe in the next 
section)  to our  results up  to  this point, we contacted 32 experts by 
e-mail, with experts being defined as study authors or dissertation su-
pervisors of at least three studies. These authors were asked whether 
they knew of other studies that may meet our criteria. In addition, we 
asked this question to all 26 authors of studies that lacked the informa-
tion needed for our meta-analysis (this group of authors overlaps with 
the expert group). This approach resulted in another three studies. (d) 
Finally, we conducted a backward search based on the bibliographies 
of the studies found so far and of the publication lists of the aforemen-
tioned 32 experts; this delivered 30 additional studies.
3.2 | Inclusion and exclusion criteria
To be included in our current meta-analysis, studies had to meet the 
following criteria: (a) Studies had to include some kind of selection 
situation. This was the case for field studies with a real selection sit-
uation (e.g., applying for a job or to a university) or laboratory studies 
with a simulated selection situation (e.g., induced by an instruction 
such as ‘Imagine you are applying for a job as a…’). This criterion was 
also applied during our search for control data from nonselection 
samples. Even though this approach drastically limited the number 
of corresponding samples, it was the only practicable way to follow 
a uniform and consistent search strategy. (b) There had to be some 
motivation for the participants to fake and present themselves in 
a favorable way. Accordingly, we excluded field studies in which it 
was clear to the participants that the personality test score would 
not be used for selection purposes (e.g., Merkulova et al., 2014) and 
studies in which it was unclear whether the participants would be 
motivated to present themselves favorably (e.g., in a compulsory 
military service examination; Boss et al., 2015). Furthermore, we ex-
cluded laboratory studies in which some tests were filled out under 
selection conditions but the personality test was not (e.g., Peeters & 
Lievens, 2005). Moreover, we excluded studies that measured fak-
ing  solely  as overclaiming  (e.g., Ackerman & Ellingsen, 2014) or  as 
a  fraud  in objective  tests  (e.g., Wright et al., 2014).  (c) Personality 
had to be measured by self-report, and the personality scales must 
belong  (or at  least be assignable  to)  the Five-Factor model of per-
sonality.  (d)  Studies  had  to  include  some  objective  measurement 
of cognitive ability in the form of an intelligence or ability test. We 






as these measurements are rather considered to be the outcome of 
cognitive ability, personality, and other factors and not as a measure 
of cognitive ability itself (e.g., Komarraju et al., 2013; Poropat, 2009). 
(e) Furthermore, studies had to report the correlation between per-
sonality test scores and cognitive ability, as we used this correlation 
as  the effect  size.  If  the  latter precondition was not met, we con-
tacted the author(s) and requested the corresponding data.  (f)  In a 
final step, we carried out a sensitivity analysis, comparing the results 
with and without the largest five percent of the samples. In this way, 
we identified seven individual samples (e.g., Arthur et al., 2014; De 
Fruyt et al., 2006; Levashina et al., 2014),  that were at  least  three 
times larger than the largest remaining study and at least 40 times 
larger than the average sample size of the remaining studies. The 
seven samples consisted exclusively of field data from personnel 
selection providers or were directly taken from the personnel se-
lection of large companies or public authorities. Thereby, the meta-
analytic calculations with and without these large samples showed 
very similar results pattern leading to the same conclusions. For 
instance, the true score correlation between cognitive ability and 
Conscientiousness in field studies was ρ = 0.079 based on all sam-
ples and ρ = 0.084 when the large samples were excluded. However, 
the results obtained including these large studies corresponded to 
the values  from  these very  large studies down  to  the 3rd decimal 
place.  However,  the  results  including  these  large  samples  were, 
except  for  the 3rd decimal place,  identical  to  the  results obtained 
by performing the meta-analytical calculations only on the basis of 
these seven studies. Since the inclusion of these samples would have 
completely overshadowed the meta-analytical results, we excluded 
these results from our analysis to avoid overemphasizing these sin-
gle sample effect sizes. Tables S3–S6 of the Supporting Information 
show the meta-analytical results if these samples are not excluded, 
Table S7 gives a more detailed overview of the excluded samples.
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3.3 | Final data set
The final data set consisted of 66 studies with 115 independent 
samples, 825 effect sizes (in total for all dimensions of the Five-
Factor model  of  personality),  and  a  total N =  46,265  participants 
(N = 2,289,508 without excluding the three disproportionately large 
studies, see exclusion criteria). Of these 66 studies, 33 came from 
the forward database search, and seven were SIOP conference ar-
ticles. Authors from our expert list made us aware of three further 
studies,  and  another  23  arose  during  the  backward  search.  The 
F I G U R E  1   Flowchart showing the 
process of identifying and selecting 
studies
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oldest included study was published in 1957; the most recent stud-





Personality  scales not based on  the Five-Factor model  of  person-
ality were  grouped  into  the model  based  on  the work  of  Salgado 
and  Táuriz  (2014).  If  a  specific  dimension  was  not  mentioned  in 
their overview, we used a strategy developed by Barrick and Mount 
(1991). Five raters, all psychology graduates (three with a PhD and 
two with a Master's degree or equivalent) categorized the leftover 
dimensions into the Five-Factor model of personality. The classifica-
tion had to be accomplished with a 75% majority; abstentions were 
not counted. If a scale could not be clearly classified, we excluded it 
from our analysis. For the purpose of simplification and better inter-
pretation, Neuroticism was reverse-coded as Emotional stability.
We  distinguished  three  types  of  cognitive  ability  tests:  verbal 
tests (e.g., the Word Comprehension subtest of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence  Scale;  Wechsler,  2014),  nonverbal  tests  (e.g.,  Raven's 
Progressive Matrices; Raven, 1938), and mixed tests (e.g., Wonderlic 
Personnel Test; Wonderlic, 1996). Categorization occurred primar-
ily according to the information provided in the corresponding ar-
ticle and was carried out by two raters independently (both with a 
Master's  degree or  equivalent).  If  the  authors  did  not  provide  the 
relevant information in the article, the categorization was conducted 
with the help of the test manuals. To be able to compare effect sizes 
in studies that provided correlations for verbal and nonverbal cog-
nitive ability tests, we calculated—as far as all required data were 
available—the composite scores and the corresponding reliabilities 
according to Schmidt and Hunter (Schmidt & Hunter, 2014, p. 442). 
If the required correlations between the variables that should be ag-
gregated were not documented, we calculated the arithmetic mean 
using Fisher's Z-values.
Some studies also reported several independent correlations be-
tween the variables of interest for a single sample (e.g., there were 
two or more correlations between personality scales that were cat-
egorized as the same personality dimension and the cognitive abil-
ity measurement, or studies provided only the correlation of two or 
more cognitive ability subtests that were both categorized as verbal/
nonverbal). In these cases, we also used the aggregation procedure 
laid out in the last paragraph.
3.5 | Meta-analytic procedures
We  followed  the  procedures  for  psychometric  meta-analysis  de-
scribed by Schmidt and Hunter (2014). Mean correlations between 





meta-analysis provides the option to correct for the unreliability of 
measurement scales and range restriction, yielding the population 
correlation ρ. As not all studies reported the required information, 
we were unable to correct correlations individually and thus used 
artifact distribution meta-analysis (Schmidt & Hunter, 2014) instead. 
Unreliability of measurement scales was corrected for cognitive abil-
ity (the predictor) and for the personality scales (the criterion). We 
also corrected for the indirect range restriction of cognitive ability, 
since many samples may have already been preselected on the basis 
of cognitive ability or related constructs (e.g., students in labora-
tory studies who are selected based on their Scholastic Assessment 
Test).  The  artifact  information was  extracted  from  the  associated 
studies, if reliabilities were not documented we took the informa-




of  the  coefficients  for  the personality  scales.  Information on  indi-
rect range restriction was available for 0.0%–61.5% of the samples. 
Tables  3–6  provide  additional  information  about  the  average  reli-
abilities, average range restriction, corresponding variances, and 
number of included coefficients for each artifact distributions used 
in the meta-analytical calculation. If no information at all was avail-
able for a meta-analytical calculation regarding predictor reliability, 
criterion reliability or range restriction, the corresponding artifact 
distribution was specified as a uniform distribution with a mean of 
1.00 and no variance (Schmidt & Hunter, 2014). In such a case, the 
corresponding aspect could not be corrected in the meta-analytic 
calculation. For the meta-analytic calculations, we used the metafor 
package (Viechtbauer, 2010) in R 3.3.3 (R Core Team, 2017) and the 
Schmidt and Le meta-analysis program (Schmidt & Le, 2005).
We report 80% credibility  intervals around ρ to provide analy-
sis of the homogeneity of the corrected effect sizes as well as the 
percentages of the variance in effect size explained by artifacts 
(Schmidt  & Hunter,  2014).  In  this  regard,  based  on  the  ‘75%  rule’ 
(Schmidt & Hunter, 2014), less than 75% variance reduction by arti-





fail-safe Ns as the number of null results that would have to 
be added to the studies in our data set to reduce the meta-an-
alytic  outcome  to  a  trivial  average  effect  size  (Orwin,  1983). 
Following  the  recommendations  of  Schmidt  and  Hunter  (2014) 
as well  as McNatt  (2000),  we  regarded  correlations  of  r = 0.05 
and below as trivial. For additional analysis of file drawer bias 
(Light & Pillemer, 1984), we created  funnel plots of  the  included 
effect sizes for all of our meta-analytic calculations using the 
R-package metafor  (Viechtbauer, 2010). These funnel plots were 
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adjusted for missing studies using the trim and fill method (Duval 
& Tweedie, 2000). All plots were relatively symmetrical, indicating 
that our meta-analysis did not seem to prioritize the consideration 
of statistically significant effects over nonsignificant effects. As 
an example, Figure 2 shows the funnel plots for the nonselection 
samples, field samples, and laboratory samples.
F I G U R E  2   Funnel plots for nonselection samples, field samples, and laboratory samples based on Bare Bones analysis. Correlations 
employed in the analysis are represented by black dots, correlations complemented by the trim and fill method are represented as white 
dots. The 95%-standard error of the mean correlation is represented as a dotted line
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4  | RESULTS
4.1 | Validation of the representativeness of our 
control data
First, we checked whether the meta-analytic outcome for our non-
selection samples corresponds with the findings of other meta-anal-
yses on the relationship between personality and cognitive ability 
(i.e., with the results of Lange; Lange, 2013; Poropat, 2009). Table 2 
shows the results of this comparison. As can be seen, the confidence 
intervals for all five dimensions show substantial overlap, indicating 
that our meta-analytic data for nonselection samples replicate the 
current state of research.
4.2 | Main analysis
Table 3 shows the meta-analytic results regarding the differences be-
tween selection and nonselection situations. The overall true-score 
correlations between cognitive ability and Five-Factor personality 
test scores in the selection samples were (nonselection correla-
tions in parentheses for direct comparison): ρConscientiousness = 0.130 
(0.001), ρEmotional stability = 0.181 (0.041), ρAgreeableness = 0.105 (0.055), 
ρExtraversion = 0.117 (0.001), and ρOpenness to experience = 0.262 (0.158). 
Confidence intervals did not include zero for any of the dimensions, 
and for all dimensions, the confidence intervals did not overlap with 




was explained by artifacts, which indicates that further moderator 
effects are likely (Schmidt & Hunter, 2014).
4.3 | Moderator analysis 1: Study design (laboratory 
vs. field)
Table  4  summarizes  the meta-analytic  results  for  the  relationship 
between cognitive ability and the Five-Factor dimensions separately 
for nonselection samples, samples derived from field studies, and 
samples derived from laboratory studies. For all five dimensions, 
the same order of moderator levels emerged: True-score correla-
tions were smallest for nonselection samples (ρ =  0.001–0.151), 
slightly higher in field studies (ρ = 0.078–0.206), and clearly higher 
in laboratory studies (ρ =  0.161–0.350).  For  Conscientiousness, 
Emotional Stability, and Extraversion, none of  the moderator-level 
confidence intervals overlapped. For Agreeableness and Openness 
to Experience, the confidence intervals did not overlap for nonse-
lection and laboratory studies but did overlap for nonselection and 
field studies. In summary, a moderation by the study design, as as-
sumed  in Hypothesis 2, was  found  for  all  dimensions of  the Five-
Factor model of personality. For both groups of studies, laboratory 
and field, the percentage of reduced variance in effect size through 
artifacts did not meet  the  traditional 75% criterion,  indicating  fur-
ther moderator effects.
4.4 | Moderator analysis 2: Type of personality test
Table 5 presents our meta-analytical results separately for the use of 
forced-choice and single-stimulus personality tests. Correlations for 
single-stimulus tests were very similar to the results for selection sit-
uations of the main analysis. Results for forced-choice tests showed 
very wide confidence intervals for Agreeableness, Extraversion, and 
Openness  to  Experience  (each  including  the  corresponding  confi-
dence  interval  on  the  single-stimulus moderator  level).  True-score 
correlations were higher for forced-choice tests than for single- 
stimulus tests when Conscientiousness was measured but were 
lower when Emotional Stability was measured.  In both cases, con-
fidence intervals were not overlapping. In summary, the results only 
partially  support Hypothesis 3, but  it must also be noted  that  the 
analysis for the moderator level of the forced-choice tests was based 
on a small number of samples and participants: In contrast to the pre-
vious analyses, the results are based on only three to seven samples 
and  at most 1,375 participants. Moreover,  only  for  the dimension 
Conscientiousness one of the included studies provided information 
about the reliability of the forced-choice personality scale, accord-
ingly, the calculations could not be corrected for the unreliability of 
the forced-choice personality scales. For the forced-choice tests, 
the percentage of reduced variance in effect size through artifacts 
TA B L E  2   Comparison of our nonselection samples with already 
published meta-analysis




ρ −0.019 0.01 0.010
95% CI [−0.052 to 0.014] [−0.02 to 0.04] [−0.011 to 0.032]
Conscientiousness
ρ 0.002 −0.04 −0.019
95% CI [−0.058 to 0.062] [−0.08 to 0.00] [−0.037 to 
−0.001]
Emotional stability
ρ 0.039 0.09 0.058
95% CI [0.018 to 0.061] [0.07 to 0.11] [0.037 to 0.080]
Extraversion
ρ −0.012 −0.02 −0.005
95% CI [−0.040 to 0.016] [−0.06 to 0.02] [−0.026 to 0.016]
Openness to experience
ρ 0.125 0.19 0.208
95% CI [0.100 to 0.151] [0.16 to 0.22] [0.186 to 0.229]
Note: The results of Poropat are not contents of the corresponding 
paper but were provided to us by the author on request.
Abbreviation: 95% CI, 95%-confidence interval [lower bound to upper 
bound].
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still did not meet the 75% criterion, which hints at further moderator 
effects.
4.5 | Moderator analysis 3: Type of cognitive 
ability test
Table 6 summarizes the meta-analytic results separately for the 
use of verbal, nonverbal, or mixed cognitive ability  tests. With  re-
gard to Hypothesis 4, we did not find a higher effect of verbal than 
of nonverbal cognitive ability tests for any of the personality di-
mensions.  However,  Conscientiousness,  Emotional  Stability,  and 
Agreeableness showed the reversed pattern. For Extraversion and 
Openness to Experience, there was no difference between the two 
types of ability tests. The results of the mixed category tended to 
lie between those for verbal and nonverbal cognitive ability tests. 
In summary, these results do not provide any evidence for the mod-
eration hypothesis specified under Hypothesis 4, but rather suggest 
that the relationships between different types of cognitive ability 
and  faking may be more complex  than hitherto assumed. Like  the 
preceding moderation analysis, this analysis was not able to explain 
the majority of variance in the corresponding effect sizes: Only one 
of the 15 separate meta-analytic calculations fulfilled the 75% crite-
rion for variance reduction.
5  | DISCUSSION
Our meta-analysis showed, for the first time, that the relationship 
between cognitive ability and personality scores differs between 
selection situations and nonselection situations. The correlations 
for selection situations were significantly positive for all dimen-
sions of the Five-Factor model of personality, and we found signif-
icantly higher meta-analytical correlations for selection samples 
(ρ =  0.105–0.262)  than  for  nonselection  samples  (ρ = 0.001–
0.158). In other words, personality test scores share more variance 
with cognitive ability when measured under selection conditions. 
Assuming that applicant faking is primarily responsible for this 
change at the construct level, our results provide evidence to 
support those faking theories which argue that cognitive ability 
is  a  determinant  of  the  ability  to  fake  (e.g., Marcus,  2009;  Snell 
et al., 1999; Tett & Simonet, 2011).
This pattern becomes even clearer when the results are consid-
ered separately according to the study design. Our results revealed 
significantly higher correlations between cognitive ability and per-
sonality in laboratory studies than in field studies. The proportion 
of variance in personality that can be explained by cognitive ability 
is particularly high in laboratory studies. These results fit in with the 
arguments put forward by some authors (e.g., Ones et al., 1996) that 
the mental processes involved in answering personality tests in a 
real application situation or in a laboratory study are hardly com-
parable. At this point, it can be stated that even if the correlations 
between field studies and nonselection studies differed, the results 
from these two study designs showed more similarity with each 
other than with the results of laboratory studies.
Indeed,  there may  be major motivational  differences  between 
the laboratory versus field situations. According to most current fak-
ing models, the relationship between faking motivation and faking 
behavior is moderated by the ability aspect of faking (e.g., Ellingson 
& McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; 
Roulin et al., 2016). The individual faking motivation in real applica-
tion situations varies greatly due to individual differences, concrete 
subjective considerations, and situational circumstances. In contrast, 
participants’ motivation to draw an improved picture of themselves 
in a laboratory study results from a well-controlled indirect (or some-
times direct) instruction to fake. This may result in a more uniform 
faking motivation in laboratory studies than in field studies. In line 
with an assumed moderating effect of cognitive ability, these limited 
motivational differences between participants in laboratory studies 
may lead to the more pronounced link between cognitive ability and 
actual faking behavior. At the same time, such differences in motiva-
tion may also be a reason why differences between field and nonse-
lection samples emerge solely regarding the personality dimensions 
of Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Extraversion. These 
dimensions likely have particularly high face validity for the work 
context—applicants might consider them to be especially important 
for future employers (see Jansen et al., 2012). Accordingly, the mo-
tivation of most applicants to present themselves in a better light 
regarding these dimensions should be uniformly high, which, in turn, 
should increase the relevance of cognitive ability for successful fak-
ing behavior.
Our  findings  regarding  different  types  of  personality  tests,  in 
particular single-stimulus and forced-choice, were less clear, mainly 
due to the small number of studies that actually used forced-choice 
tests.  However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  correlations  between 
Conscientiousness and cognitive ability in samples utilizing forced-
choice tests were among the highest of all meta-analytic calculations 
in this study (ρ = 0.310). This may also be attributable  to  the  fact 
that applicants consider this dimension to be particularly import-
ant for a future employer (cf. Jansen et al., 2012). In forced-choice 
tests, applicants usually have to choose between several response 
options that belong to different personality dimensions. Applicants 
with high cognitive ability might excel in recognizing the importance 
of Conscientiousness for the world of work, and therefore be more 
likely to choose answers corresponding to this dimension than ap-
plicants with lower cognitive ability. As such, our findings support 
many authors’ claims that forced-choice personality tests appear 
to be harder to fake than single-stimulus tests (e.g., Christiansen 
et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2000), but for this reason, they may also 
lead to a bias in favor of applicants with higher cognitive ability 
(Rothstein & Goffin, 2006; Vasilopoulos et al., 2006).
With regard to the type of cognitive ability tests, our meta-an-
alytic results contradicted the findings of previous research (Grieve 
&  Mahar,  2010;  MacCann,  2013).  Our  findings  concerning  this 
moderator analysis did not show a higher effect in the samples in 
which verbal cognitive ability was measured; rather, they indicated a 
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stronger effect of nonverbal cognitive ability on faking in personal-
ity tests. Moreover, we even found a negative relationship between 
Conscientiousness and verbal cognitive ability in selection samples 
(ρ = −0.054). A possible explanation for this counterintuitive finding 
might be that merely understanding the items can be accomplished 
equally well by all applicants and is not the main hurdle for faking 
in personality  tests.  Instead, nonverbal abilities  such as  the ability 
to see patterns behind items (i.e., being able to detect the corre-
sponding dimension) and to conclude the required characteristics for 
a job (e.g., Kleinmann et al., 2011; König et al., 2007) might be more 
important for successful faking.
5.1 | Theoretical implications and future 
research directions
This study contributes to the theoretical understanding of faking in 
several main aspects. First, our results help to clarify the question 
of the role of cognitive ability in the process of faking in personality 
tests. We were able  to  show  that personality  tests  share a higher 




cognitive ability does play a role in personality assessment in selec-
tion situations. This supports the idea already put forward by pre-
vious researchers  (Klehe et al., 2012; Wrensen & Biderman, 2005) 
that filling out a personality test in a selection situation is driven by 
a slightly different underlying process than filling out such a test in a 
nonselection context.
Second,  our  findings  support  an  additional  explanation  of  the 
criterion validity of personality tests in personnel selection, which 
has also been discussed  in previous  faking  research  (e.g.,  Johnson 
& Hogan, 2006; Kleinmann et al., 2011). In general, cognitive ability 
is one of the best predictors of work performance, which may also 
explain at least some part of the criterion validity of personality tests 
through the relationship studied in this meta-analysis. Although the 
variance in personality tests is likely dominated by personality con-
structs, it also seems to be influenced by variance in cognitive ability, 
the questions arise to which extent this is the case.
Third, the discrepancies we found between different study de-
signs also indicate that the construct captured in laboratory studies 
does not fully correspond to the construct captured in real selection 
situations. Although Ones et al. (1996) had already pointed out that 
the mental processes underlying the filling out of a personality test 
may differ between laboratory and field situations, our results even 
indicate that this discrepancy may be greater than that between se-
lection and nonselection situations. This, in turn, raises the question 
of to what extent results from laboratory studies can be generalized 
to real selection situations, and whether recommendations for per-
sonnel selection should be derived from such results at all.
For further research, we would, therefore, like to encourage a 
stronger focus on field studies wherever possible. We also call for a 
stronger verification of the construct validity of the personality tests 
used in the selection context, and above all, we recommend that this 
psychometric property is evaluated in the actual selection context. 
Most importantly, in our opinion, faking research should focus more 
on the mental processes, strategies, and objectives of applicants 
in  selection  situations  (cf.  König  et  al.,  2012;  Ziegler,  2011).  Only 
through a better understanding of what is going on in the mind of 
applicants when they fill out personality tests can we fully under-
stand the phenomenon of faking.
Furthermore, we would like to encourage all researchers in the 
field of faking to publish more information in their papers to facili-
tate meta-analytical  research.  In this meta-analysis, we would also 
have liked to more directly analyze the relationship between cogni-
tive ability and faking, but far too few studies reported the required 
correlations (e.g., between cognitive ability and the raw difference 
scores between honest and faking condition). Some of the primary 
studies included in our meta-analysis also lacked correlation tables 
for the study variables and we thus had to request this very basic 
static information from the authors. In our opinion, it is, therefore, 
essential for the aggregability but also for the replicability of faking 
research that all further studies report the following information: (a) 
a detailed description of the faking instruction, ideally in the origi-
nal wording,  (b)  reliabilities, means, and standard deviations  for all 
study variables, individually for all groups and conditions, and the 
corresponding correlation  tables, and  (c)  for within-person studies 
the correlations of the raw as well as the regression adjusted differ-
ence faking scores  (see Burns & Christiansen, 2011) with all study 
variables.
5.2 | Implications for personnel selection
In the real world of personnel selection, many organizations are con-
cerned that applicants’ faking behavior might seriously undermine 
the usefulness and validity of personality tests. Therefore, persons 
in charge of personnel selection may be greatly interested to know 
that cognitive ability plays a major role when applicants fill out a 
personality test and that more intelligent applicants also tend to 
have higher scores on such personality tests. In our opinion, these 
findings may inform the use of personality tests in personnel selec-
tion in at least two aspects. (a) Our findings raise the question of to 
which extent the intended personality constructs are being meas-
ured in selection situations and to which extent personality tests in 
assessments measure cognitive ability. At this point, a company may 
argue that as long as employees perform well, it does not matter 
whether they are doing so because they are truly conscientious or 
because they are conscientious and smart, but the answer to this 
question may affect organizations’ internal justification and selec-
tion of personality tests as a personnel selection tool. (b) As a further 
practical implication of our findings, we recommend caution when 
using forced-choice tests to measure personality. Forced-choice 
tests are considered harder to fake (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2005; 
Jackson  et  al.,  2000)  but  also  showed  a  fairly  large  proportion  of 
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shared variance with cognitive ability. Especially for the dimension 
of Conscientiousness, which has the highest predictive validity for 
work performance  (Barrick & Mount, 1991), we  found high  corre-
lations  with  cognitive  ability.  Organizations  should,  therefore,  be 
aware that forced-choice tests likely have the advantage of being 
less prone to faking and simultaneously the disadvantage of measur-
ing the actual construct of personality to an even smaller extent than 
single-stimulus tests.
5.3 | Limitations
Three main limitations of the present meta-analysis need to be men-
tioned: First, we were unable to analyze the relationship between 
cognitive ability and faking in a direct manner—our approach only 
allowed us to compare correlations of personality and ability in se-
lection and nonselection situations and to conclude the effect on 
faking from the corresponding discrepancies. The main reason for 
this limitation is that there was an insufficient number of primary 
studies that reported the correlations between cognitive ability 
and some direct measure of faking (e.g., the difference between an 
honest  condition  and  an  ‘as  applicant’  condition). Hopefully, more 
researchers will report such information in the future, enabling 
such correlations to be summarized in future meta-analytic work. 
Second, many of our analyses did not  fulfill  the 75% rule  for vari-
ance  reduction,  suggesting  room for other moderators  (Schmidt & 
Hunter, 2014), which should be explored by future research. Third, 
it must be pointed out that the correlations found between cogni-
tive ability and personality in selection situations were significantly 
higher than those in nonselection samples, but were rather small in 
effect size (Cohen, 1992; Hemphill, 2003; Paterson et al., 2016). In 
general, cognitive ability plays a meaningful role in the assessment of 
personality in selection situations, but not the most influential role.
6  | CONCLUSION
Personality tests are considered to be a valid instrument for predict-
ing work performance but are often criticized for their susceptibility 
to faking. In this context, the role played by applicants’ cognitive abil-
ity in faking remains controversial. The results of this meta-analysis 
shed some light on this issue by revealing substantially higher cor-
relations between cognitive ability and personality in selection situa-
tions than in nonselection situations. Thus, our findings suggest that 
other mental processes take place when filling out personality tests 
in selection situations and that accordingly, a somewhat different 
psychological construct might be captured compared to nonselection 
situations. Viewed as a whole, this also provides indirect evidence 
for a link between cognitive ability and faking. Moderator analyses 
showed that the correlations with cognitive ability are particularly 
high in laboratory studies, whereas the correlations in field studies 
differ from nonselection situations to a considerably lesser degree. 
These findings suggest that the response behavior of participants in 
laboratory studies may be less representative of applicants in real se-
lection situations than expected. Accordingly, the results obtained in 
the laboratory should only be generalized with the utmost caution. 
To gain a more holistic view of faking, future research may also be 
well served by shifting the focus somewhat away from predictors of 
this phenomenon and moving toward mental processes, strategies, 
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